Feb. 1, 2007
James Mann
Before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission hearing on "U.S.-China Relationship: Economics and Security in Perspective"
2007年2月1日由美中经济暨安全审议委员会召开的一场公听会上，前《华盛顿邮报》记者及着名作家James Mann发表「美中关系：经济与安全透视」的演讲
Members of the Panel:
I want to talk to you today, not about the details and day-to-day developments in U.S.-China relations, but about the broader perspective. What I am about to say reflects what I have concluded after observing Washington policy towards China for the past 23 years, originally as a Beijing-based correspondent for the Los Angeles Times, but then throughout most of this period as a newspaper reporter and as an author based in Washington. This is a shortened version of the ideas I have presented in a new book, "The China Fantasy: How Our Leaders Explain Away Chinese Repression."
今天我要跟各位谈的，不是美中关系的细节和每日的发展，而是着眼於更大的面向。要谈的内容是我过去23年来观察华府中国政策的结论。
我先是担任洛杉矶时报驻北京特派员，不过，这23年里，主要是担任报纸记者与在华府一带活动的作家。这篇讲稿是我的新书《中国幻想：我们的主政者如何淡化中国的镇压》的精简版。
In short, I think many of the problems we face in dealing with China are conceptual in nature. Our policy and our public discourse about China are often affected by ideas, assumptions, rationalizations and phrases that we fail to examine.
一言以蔽之，在处理中国时，我们所面对的许多问题本质上是观念的问题。我们对中国的政策与公开讨论通常都受到从未加以检验的概念丶假定丶合理化，与词汇所影响。
Above all, I believe, our policy towards China simply operates with the wrong paradigm.
特别是，我相信，我们的中国政策是以错误的论述运作。
Let me explain this by way of an analogy. Most of us, I think, are familiar with the argument - a legitimate one, I believe-- that the current Bush administration was caught unprepared for the September 11 attacks because its officials had the wrong paradigm: In foreign policy, they were preoccupied with conventional states, and not focused on non-state actors like al-Qaeda. The problem wasn't merely in policy, but in overall conception: they expected the world to operate much as it had been, and they failed to anticipate a fundamental change.
容我用类比的方式对此加以解释。
我想我们大部分对底下这个论题相当熟悉，而我也相信这是个正当合理的论题，那就是，布希政府对911的攻击没有做任何的因应准备，因为政府官员秉持的是错误的模式：在外交政策上，他们心中所想的是传统国家，并未把焦点摆在非国家的行动者，比方「基地」组织。
问题不单只是政策面，而是整个观念：他们期待世界会依照过去的方式运作，他们没有预期到一种根本性的改变。
In our dealing with China, the problem of the wrong paradigm comes from the opposite direction. It's not that we have failed to anticipate change. Rather, it's that we assume change is coming to China - that is, change in China's political system. Looking at the country's startling economic growth and the remarkable economic changes that have taken place in China, Americans, particularly in our political and business elites, regularly talk as though China is inevitably destined for political change as well. Yet, in my view, while China will certainly be a richer and more powerful country 25 years from now, it could still be an autocracy of one form or another. Its leadership (the Communist Party, or whatever it may call itself in the future) may not be willing to tolerate organized political opposition any more than it does today. This is a prospect that our current paradigm of an inevitably changing China cannot seem to envision.
而我们处理中国所持的错误模式刚好是相反的。并非我们没有预期改变，更确切地说，是我们设想改变会发生在中国，亦即，中国政治体制的改变。美国人，特别是我们的政治与经济菁英，经常谈论中国惊人的经济成长丶显着的经济变化，俨然中国因此必然会在政治上改变。
不过，就我的看法，中国在未来的25年无疑将会更富裕丶更强盛，但仍有可能执行某种形式的独裁政权。此一政权的领导（共产党，或不论其未来如何自称）可能不愿容忍政治主张不同的反对势力，一如现在。这种可能，是现今我们对中国必然会改变的论述所未能看见的。
The paradigm of China's inevitable political change has been repeatedly put forward by prominent political leaders of both parties. President George W. Bush offered his version of the paradigm at the beginning of his campaign for the White House: "The case for trade is not just monetary, but moral," Bush declared in one of his earliest foreign-policy speeches in November 1999. "Economic freedom creates habits of liberty. And habits of liberty create expectations of democracy....Trade freely with China, and time is on our side."
中国在政治上必然会改变的论述模式，共和丶民主两党的政治领袖一再沿用。布希总统竞选总统初期，一开始就提出他在这方面的版本：「与中国的贸易，不单只是着眼於金钱，也同时是关乎道德。」
这是1999年11月有关外交政策最早的一次演说里宣布的。「经济自由创造自由的习惯，而自由的习惯创造对民主的期待…与中国自由贸易，时间站在我们这边。」
In saying this, Bush was merely echoing the words of Bill Clinton. The Democratic president had told Chinese President Jiang Zemin at a 1997 press conference that "you're on the wrong side of history," thus suggesting that "history" would open up China's political system. Earlier that year, Clinton had declared that the economic changes in China would help to "increase the spirit of liberty over time...I just think it's inevitable, just as inevitably the Berlin Wall fell."
布希此一讲法充其量是在附和柯林顿的话。柯林顿在1997年的一项记者会上曾向江泽民说「你站在历史错误的一边，」这意味「历史」会打开中国的政治体制。
该年稍早，柯林顿宣称中国经济的改变，将有助於「自由精神的推进…我认为这是必然的，就如柏林围墙必然倒下。」
I should emphasize here that when I am talking about political change in China, I am speaking about the fundamental realities of the current system, in which there is no organized political opposition, in which the press remains under censorship, and in which there are no elections beyond the limited and problematic elections at the township level. There are those who argue China's political system is already changing, but when they say that they are focusing on far lesser changes, ones that do not affect the one-party state and its monopoly on political power. The argument that the Chinese system is changing seeks to divert attention to smaller realities and away from the large ones.
在此，我要特别强调的是，当我论及中国的政治改变，我指的是现今体制的根本事实，那就是政治上缺乏有组织的反对势力丶新闻仍遭审查丶没有普选，除了影响有限丶颇有问题的村里长选举。
有人辩称中国政治体制已经在改变，但这些改变实在微不足道，并不足以影响党国一体与共产党对政治权力的独揽。中国政治体制已在改变的说法，用意是在将注意力转移到较小的事实，避开大的事实。
This paradigm of a China that is destined for political change has deep roots in American policy over the past 35 years. It took hold because it has served certain specific interests in Washington and within American society. At first, in the late 1970s and 1980s, this idea benefited America's national-security establishment. At the time, the United States was seeking close cooperation with China against the Soviet Union, so that the Soviet Union would have to worry about both America and China at once; the Pentagon was eager to ensure that the Soviet Union was required to deploy large numbers of troops along the Sino-Soviet border that might otherwise have been deployed in Europe. Amid the ideological struggles of the Cold War, cooperation with China's Communist regime was politically touchy in Washington. And so the notion that the Chinese leadership - in this case, the China of Deng Xiaoping -- was in the process of changing the country's political system helped smooth the way with Congress and the American public.
此一中国在政治上必然会改变的论述模式，根植於过去35年来的美国政策。它之能根深蒂固，是因为它符合华府以及美国社会某些的特殊利益。
首先，在1970年代末期与1980年代，此一论述模式有益美国国家安全体制。当时，美国寻求与中国的紧密合作以对抗苏联，如此一来，苏联必然在中苏边界部署重兵，若非如此，这些重兵将部署在欧洲。
冷战时期意识型态的对抗中，与中共政权合作，对华府而言是政治上敏感的问题。因此，当时中国的领导邓小平，即着手进行政治体制改变的说法，有助於减少来自国会与美国大众的阻碍。
In the 1990s, following the Soviet collapse, the paradigm of a China headed for political change attracted a new and different constituency: the business community. As trade and investment in China became ever more important, American companies (and their counterparts in Europe and Japan) found themselves repeatedly beset with questions about why they were doing business with a repressive regime, one which had so recently ordered its troops to fire at unarmed citizens. The paradigm of inevitable change offered multinational corporations the answer they needed. Not only was China destined to open up its political system, but trade would be the key that would unlock the door. Trade would lead to political liberalization and to democracy. The trouble is that the entire theory may be dead wrong.
1990年代，随着苏联的瓦解，此一中国迈向政治改变的论述模式，吸引了新的丶与过去不同的认同者：商业圈。当在中国的贸易投资益形重要时，美国公司（与欧洲和日本的公司）不断遭遇到跟专制政权做生意的质疑，这个政权不久前才下令军队向没有武装的人民开火。
而此一必然改变的论述模式，提供了跨国公司需要的答案。不仅中国注定会开放其政治体制，贸易更将是打开那道门的钥匙。贸易将会导致政治自由丶走向民主。问题是整个立论可能是全盘错误。
The notion that China's political system will inevitably move towards liberalization and democracy is what I call the Soothing Scenario for China's future. It is the one that dominates our official discourse. But it is really only one of three possibilities for where China is headed. Let me sketch out the others.
中国的政治体制必然会走向自由民主的说法，我称之为中国未来「安慰人心的局面」。此一说法主宰我们政府官员的谈话。不过，这只是中国未来三种可能走向其中一项。我下面勾漏的是另外两种可能。
The second possibility for China's future is what can be called the Upheaval Scenario. The Upheaval Scenario predicts that China is headed for some sort of major disaster, such as an economic collapse or political disintegration, because it won't be able to maintain political stability while continuing on its current course. On behalf of the Upheaval Scenario, one might point to the numerous reports of political unrest in China these days - the proliferation of labor strikes, farmers' protests, riots over environmental degradation and ethnic strife. There are also broader developments, such as the ever-growing disparity between rich and poor or the continuing prevalence of corruption in China, and the fragility of China's banking system.
中国未来的第二种可能，即所谓的「动乱局面」。
此一立论预言中国会走向某种重大灾难，比方经济崩溃或政治解体，因为中国若持续目前的走向，将无法维持政治稳定。站在这一派的说法，可能会指出中国近来政治动乱的无数报导──工人罢工有增无减丶农民抗议丶环境恶化引起的暴动丶种族对立；另外更广泛的发展，像是贫富差距越来越大丶中国遍在持续恶化的贪腐丶中国银行虚弱的体系等等。
The Upheaval Scenario for China gets a reasonable amount of attention in the United States. Lots of people spend quite a bit of time trying to figure out how much instability there is in China and what its impact will be, and there are lots of interesting arguments on all sides. My own belief is that the Chinese regime is ultimately strong enough to withstand these internal pressures - that there will be no "coming collapse of China," to quote the title of one book on the subject. China is a huge country, and it is particularly hard to draw conclusions about the overall political situation from what is happening in any one place or region. Labor strikes may spread through all of Northeast China; or political demonstrations may sweep through many of its leading cities; still, in the end such events don't determine the future direction of China.
「动乱局面」在美国获得相当程度的注意。不少人尝试了解中国会有多不稳定，将带来什麽冲击，而各方也提出有意思的辩论。不过，我自己则相信中国政权非常稳固，足以抵挡这些内部压力，套一句讨论这方面的一本书的书名，我们不会看到「中国即将崩溃」。
中国是一个庞大的国家，特别是关於其整个政治状况，我们很难从任何单一地区所发生的事件下结论。工人罢工可能会扩及中国整个东北，或政治示威可能会在几个重要的大城市扩散，不过，这些事件终究无法决定中国未来的走向。
The possibilities for China's future are not confined to these two scenarios, the Soothing Scenario or Upheaval. There is still another possibility: a Third Scenario. It is one that few people talk about or think about these days, at least not in the United States. It is this: What if China manages to continue on its current economic path and yet its political system does not change in any fundamental way? What if, twenty-five or thirty years from now, a wealthier, more powerful China continues to be run by a one-party regime that continues to repress organized political dissent much as it does today; and yet at the same time China is also open to the outside world and, indeed, is deeply intertwined with the rest of the world through trade, investment and other economic ties? Everyone assumes that the Chinese political system is going to open up - but what if it doesn't?
中国未来可能的发展并不限於这两套演论，即「安慰人心的局面」与「动乱局面」。还有另一种可能，即第三种演论。
这在目前仍然很少人讨论，至少在美国还没有人触及。即是说，万一中国尽其所能继续其目前所走的经济路线，但丝毫不做任何政治体制的根本改变？万一25或 30年後，一个更富裕丶更强盛的中国仍如今日一般，继续其一党专政丶镇压政治异议团体，同时对世界各国开放，在贸易丶投资与其他经济连结上，和世界有着盘根交错的关系；大家都假设中国的政治体制会开放，不过，要是没有呢？
In one way or another, the essentials of the current political system would remain intact: there would be no significant political opposition. There would be an active security apparatus to forestall organized political dissent. In other words, China, while growing stronger and richer, wouldn't change its political system in any fundamental way. It would continue along the same political course it is on today. Why do we Americans believe that, with advancing prosperity, China will automatically come to have a political system like ours? Is it simply because the Chinese now eat at McDonald's and wear blue jeans? To make this assumption about China is to repeat the mistakes others have made in the past - that is, to think wrongly that the Chinese are inevitably becoming like us. "With God's help, we will lift Shanghai up and up until it is just like Kansas City," Senator Kenneth Wherry of Nebraska declared during the era of Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist China. Those dreams ended in disappointment.So, too,in the early 1950s, Soviet leaders thought they were recreating a communist China that would be similar to the Soviet Union. They also were wrong.
不管是哪种方式，目前政治体制的实质仍然不会受到丝毫影响：我们不会看到有份量的政治反对势力，可以看见的是执行力很强的安全机制对政治反动组织采取先发制人。换言之，一个更强盛丶更富裕的中国，不会在政治体制上做任何根本的改变。其政治路线将与现今所走的没有差异。
何以我们美国人要相信中国在步向富裕後，自然而然就会有一个跟我们相似的政治体制？就因为中国人现在也吃麦当劳丶穿牛仔裤？做这样的臆想，即是重蹈过去别人所犯的错误，也就是说，错误地认为中国人必然会像我们一样。
在蒋介石国民党时代的中国，当时内布拉斯加的参议员坎尼斯·惠瑞宣称：「有上帝襄助，我们可以把上海拉拔起来，直到像我们的堪萨斯城。」那些梦想最後以失望收场。同样的情况也发生在1950年代初期，当时苏联的领导认为，他们扶植的中国共产党将会是苏联的再制。他们同样错了。
Let me address one of the main arguments advanced by those who put forward the Soothing Scenario. Proponents often point to the recent history of other countries in East Asia. In particularly, they regularly cite the examples of Taiwan and South Korea. From the 1950s through the 1970s, both had authoritarian systems in which police and security officials regularly locked up political opponents of the regimes. Then during the 1980s, as rapid economic development brought increasing prosperity to Taiwan and South Korea, both countries opened up to democracy. And so, the logic goes, China will eventually follow along the political path of Taiwan and South Korea.
现在我将针对「安慰人心的局面」的主要论点进行剖析。
此说的支持者经常指出东亚其他国家近来的演变，特别是台湾与南韩最常被当作例子。从1950年代到1970年代，这两个国家都施行威权体制，警察与国安人员关押反对独裁政权的人士时有所闻。之後在1980年代，经济的突飞猛进带来台湾与南韩的繁荣，两国并迈向民主。因此，同理，中国也将跟随台湾与南韩的政治路径。
There are two problems with this logic. First, China is a much bigger country than either Taiwan or South Korea. It includes vast, impoverished inland areas as well as coastal cities of the east. If China were confined exclusively to these coastal areas, such as Guangdong, the province abutting Hong Kong, one could easily imagine it following the path of Taiwan and South Korea. Certainly Shanghai, with its educated, sophisticated citizenry and intense interest in politics, is as ready for democracy as any city has ever been.
此一逻辑有两个漏洞。
首先，中国比台湾或南韩大很多，领土涵盖广大贫瘠的内地与东部沿海城市。若中国就只是这些沿海地区，像邻近香港的广东，那我们就很容易想像它会跟随台湾与南韩的路径。而上海拥有受教育丶世故丶对政治有强烈兴趣的市民，要准备迎接民主，不会输给其他任何城市。
But large expanses of China are isolated - geographically, politically and intellectually - from cities such as Shanghai. Outsiders who declare that China will follow the political evolution of Taiwan and South Korea, based on their visits to eastern Chinese cities like Beijing and Shanghai, are roughly akin to foreigners who travel only to New York City and Boston and then come to the conclusion that the United States will behave like Western Europe.
不过，中国大部分地区，在地理上丶政治上丶智识上，仍是与像上海这些城市隔绝。局外人根据他们到访像北京与上海这些中国东岸城市，进而宣称中国将步向台湾与南韩的政治演进，这就像外国人仅参访过纽约市与波士顿，就骤下结论说，美国的作为将会和西欧一样。
There is also a second, more important way in which China is different from Taiwan and South Korea. When those two East Asian governments democratized in the 1980s, both of them were dependent on the United States for their military security. Indeed, direct American pressure played a crucial role in supporting the movement towards political liberalization in both countries. In the case of South Korea, at a key moment in June 1987 when the country was engulfed by riots, the Reagan administration bluntly told President Chun Doo Hwan he should give way and hold elections. In the case of Taiwan, leading Democratic members of the U.S. Congress took the lead, making plain to President Chiang Ching-kuo during the 1980s that his Kuomintang government was rapidly losing American support, and that the only way to regain it was through democratic reforms.
中国与台湾丶南韩之间，还有第二点更重要的差异。
当这两个东亚国家在1980年代实施民主化时，他们仰赖美国保护他们的军事安全。事实上，在这两个国家，美国的直接压力，为政治自由化运动扮演了主要的推手。
以南韩为例，1987年6月是个关键时刻，当时这个国家因为暴动而陷入重重危机，雷根政府不客气地告诉全斗换总统，应该放弃独裁，举行选举。至於台湾，民主党重量级的国会议员首先开炮，明白地告诉1980年代担任总统的蒋经国，他的国民党政府正急速失去美国的支持，要重新获得支持，只有藉民主改革。
But China of course will never be as dependent on the United States for military protection as were South Korea and Taiwan, It is vastly less subject to American pressure, goading or influence. As a result, there is no reason to believe it will automatically follow their political evolution.
不过，中国将不会像南韩与台湾那样仰赖美国的军事保护。它远远不受美国的压力丶驱使或影响。值此之故，实在没有理由相信中国必然会步向台湾与南韩的政治演进。
In conformity with America's continuing adherence to the Soothing Scenario for China (that is, the belief in China's inevitable political evolution), we have developed a series of rationalizations and euphemisms that help to maintain our beliefs. To take one example: "Two Steps Forward, One Step Back." When news breaks that China has rounded up someone or some group opposing the regime, proponents of the Soothing Scenario warn that one must not draw broader conclusions about China and the nature of its political system from this one particular untoward event. This latest arrest, it is said, was just one minor setback. Over the past two decades, the same cliche has been used, over and over again, to explain away repression or the absence of political change in China. Sometimes, when China carries out a broad crackdown, it looks as if the more accurate description would be "one step forward, five steps back." But the "two steps forward, one step back" cliche does not countenance such retrogression. Thus, even unpleasant news about Chinese repression tends to be safely embedded in an assumption of progress, a soft, warm gauzy wrapping of hopefulness.
为了不背离美国坚持中国的「安慰人心的局面」（亦即，相信中国的政治体制必然会演进），我们发展了一系列合理化说辞与委婉说法，以便有足够的燃料持续我们的信仰。比方「进两步，退一步」就是其中一个例子。
当新闻报导中国逮捕反对其政权的个人或团体时，支持「安慰人心的局面」的人就会警告说，不可因为单一特殊的事件，就骤然对中国及其政治体制的本质做扩大的结论。最近的逮捕只不过是一个小小的退步。过去20年来这类老掉牙的说辞被一用再用，藉以淡化镇压或中国在政治改变上的不做为。
有时候，当中国采取大规模镇压时，看起来比较正确的描述应是：「进一步，退五步。」不过，「进两步，退一步」的老调是不会容许这样的退步。也因此，有关中国镇压的不愉快消息似乎都能够安全地埋在一个进步的推论，一个以柔和丶温暖丶朦胧所包装的希望里。
Finally, it is worth considering the possibility that the paradigm of inevitable political change that our leaders use in talking in public about China does not represent what they privately believe.
最後，我们执政当局在公开讲话时，宣称中国政治体制未来必然改变，但他们私底下有可能不相信此一论述模式，这种可能性值得我们思考。
It is possible to imagine a set of beliefs about China as follows: "We understand that China's political system is not destined for political liberalization. The Chinese system is going to remain relatively unchanged for a very long time, and the regime is going to continue to repress any sign of organized political opposition. Still, we want to and have to do business with China, both economically and diplomatically."
对中国的信仰，我们可以想像如下的说法：
「我们了解到中国的政治体制并不必然会走向政治自由，中国的体制在很长的一段时间仍将维持较为不变的局面，该政权将持续镇压任何政治反对势力的蛛丝马迹。不过，在经济上与外交上，我们还是希望而且必须跟中国做生意。」
This would be a point of view that is certainly clear and coherent, and I suspect that among America's political and financial leaders, there are many who privately hold this view. It is worth asking why this point of view is so little discussed in public. The answer, I believe, is that American policy towards China requires public support -- and the way to maintain public support for American policy, particularly its current relationship with China is to claim that this will serve the purpose of changing China's political system. Since 1989, virtually every change in U.S. policy towards China has been justified to the American public on the basis that it would help to open up China's political system. Whenever a president, either Republican or Democratic, spoke of his policy of "engagement" with China, it was said to be a way of changing China. When the George H.W. Bush and Clinton administrations extended most-favored-nation trade benefits to China, they asserted that the trade would help to open up China. When the U.S. Congress voted to support China's entry into the World Trade Organization, once again, congressional leaders justified their votes as a way of helping to bring political liberalization to China.
这将会是一个清楚一致的观点，我想美国政界与商界的领袖有不少人私底下是采取这样的看法。
我们要问的是何以这样的观点甚少公开讨论？我相信答案是美国对中国的政策需要大众的支持，而让大众支持美国政策的方式，就是宣称我们的目的是在改变中国政治体制，特别是目前与中国的关系。
自1989年以来几乎每一次美国对中国政策的改变，诉诸美国大众合理化的说辞，都是基於帮助打开中国的政治体制，不管是共和党或民主党的说法，一提到其与中国的「交往」政策，都说是改变中国的一种方式。
当布希与柯林顿政府延长中国最惠国待遇时，他们都宣称贸易有助於中国的开放。当美国国会投票支持中国加入世界贸易组织时，国会领袖们对他们投下赞成票的合理化说辞是，这有助於中国的政治自由化。
Our economic policies in dealing with China have caused considerable hardship to significant numbers of Americans. Across the United States, factories have closed and millions of Americans have been put out of work. There have been some benefits to those policies as well, especially to companies investing or manufacturing in China; yet if these policies had been judged exclusively in economic terms, they might not have won the public support and congressional approval that was necessary. As a result, the American people have been told repeatedly that the reasons for our policy were not merely economic but political. Unrestricted free trade with China was going to lead to political liberalization. It was going to open the way for China to become a pluralistic country. These political arguments were the ones that made the difference. Without the claim that trade would open up the Chinese political system, trade legislation probably would not have been enacted. It is difficult if not impossible to find an American president or congressional leader who said, "China has a repressive political system and it's not going to change, but let's pass this legislation anyway."
我们处理中国的经济政策已导致为数不少的美国人民陷於困境。美国境内许多工厂关闭，上百万的美国人因此失业。
有些人的确因为这些政策获得利益，特别是在中国投资或生产的公司；不过，这些政策若仅就经济而言，可能不会赢得大众的支持或国会通过。结果就是，美国人民一再被告知，我们的政策不单只是经济，还关乎政治的考量。与中国毫无限制的自由贸易，会把中国导向政治自由化，将使中国成为一个多元的国家。
就是这些政治论调使得事情变得不一样。若非宣称贸易可以打开中国政治体制，贸易立法很有可能不会制定。我们很难想像一个美国总统或国会议长会说，「中国有个压制的政治体制，而且短期内不会有所改变，不过无论如何，还是让我们通过立法。」
In sum, I think the paradigm of inevitable change impairs America's thinking and its public discussion of China today. The paradigm prevents us from coming up with policies towards a China whose political may not change, in any fundamental way, for a long time. But I think the paradigm of inevitable change will endure -- that whenever American leaders talk in public about China, we will continue to hear some version or another of the Soothing Scenario.
总而言之，我以为必然会改变的论述模式损害了美国对中国的思维和公众讨论。中国在很长的一段时间内，政治上可能不会有任何根本的改变，而这个论述模式阻碍了我们针对此一状况拟定政策。
不过，我个人认为必然会改变的论述模式仍将持续，每当美国领导人公开谈话论及中国时，我们仍将继续听到「安慰人心的局面」或其某种版本出现。
2007.02.09
James Mann
Before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission hearing on "U.S.-China Relationship: Economics and Security in Perspective"
2007年2月1日由美中经济暨安全审议委员会召开的一场公听会上，前《华盛顿邮报》记者及着名作家James Mann发表「美中关系：经济与安全透视」的演讲
Members of the Panel:
I want to talk to you today, not about the details and day-to-day developments in U.S.-China relations, but about the broader perspective. What I am about to say reflects what I have concluded after observing Washington policy towards China for the past 23 years, originally as a Beijing-based correspondent for the Los Angeles Times, but then throughout most of this period as a newspaper reporter and as an author based in Washington. This is a shortened version of the ideas I have presented in a new book, "The China Fantasy: How Our Leaders Explain Away Chinese Repression."
今天我要跟各位谈的，不是美中关系的细节和每日的发展，而是着眼於更大的面向。要谈的内容是我过去23年来观察华府中国政策的结论。
我先是担任洛杉矶时报驻北京特派员，不过，这23年里，主要是担任报纸记者与在华府一带活动的作家。这篇讲稿是我的新书《中国幻想：我们的主政者如何淡化中国的镇压》的精简版。
In short, I think many of the problems we face in dealing with China are conceptual in nature. Our policy and our public discourse about China are often affected by ideas, assumptions, rationalizations and phrases that we fail to examine.
一言以蔽之，在处理中国时，我们所面对的许多问题本质上是观念的问题。我们对中国的政策与公开讨论通常都受到从未加以检验的概念丶假定丶合理化，与词汇所影响。
Above all, I believe, our policy towards China simply operates with the wrong paradigm.
特别是，我相信，我们的中国政策是以错误的论述运作。
Let me explain this by way of an analogy. Most of us, I think, are familiar with the argument - a legitimate one, I believe-- that the current Bush administration was caught unprepared for the September 11 attacks because its officials had the wrong paradigm: In foreign policy, they were preoccupied with conventional states, and not focused on non-state actors like al-Qaeda. The problem wasn't merely in policy, but in overall conception: they expected the world to operate much as it had been, and they failed to anticipate a fundamental change.
容我用类比的方式对此加以解释。
我想我们大部分对底下这个论题相当熟悉，而我也相信这是个正当合理的论题，那就是，布希政府对911的攻击没有做任何的因应准备，因为政府官员秉持的是错误的模式：在外交政策上，他们心中所想的是传统国家，并未把焦点摆在非国家的行动者，比方「基地」组织。
问题不单只是政策面，而是整个观念：他们期待世界会依照过去的方式运作，他们没有预期到一种根本性的改变。
In our dealing with China, the problem of the wrong paradigm comes from the opposite direction. It's not that we have failed to anticipate change. Rather, it's that we assume change is coming to China - that is, change in China's political system. Looking at the country's startling economic growth and the remarkable economic changes that have taken place in China, Americans, particularly in our political and business elites, regularly talk as though China is inevitably destined for political change as well. Yet, in my view, while China will certainly be a richer and more powerful country 25 years from now, it could still be an autocracy of one form or another. Its leadership (the Communist Party, or whatever it may call itself in the future) may not be willing to tolerate organized political opposition any more than it does today. This is a prospect that our current paradigm of an inevitably changing China cannot seem to envision.
而我们处理中国所持的错误模式刚好是相反的。并非我们没有预期改变，更确切地说，是我们设想改变会发生在中国，亦即，中国政治体制的改变。美国人，特别是我们的政治与经济菁英，经常谈论中国惊人的经济成长丶显着的经济变化，俨然中国因此必然会在政治上改变。
不过，就我的看法，中国在未来的25年无疑将会更富裕丶更强盛，但仍有可能执行某种形式的独裁政权。此一政权的领导（共产党，或不论其未来如何自称）可能不愿容忍政治主张不同的反对势力，一如现在。这种可能，是现今我们对中国必然会改变的论述所未能看见的。
The paradigm of China's inevitable political change has been repeatedly put forward by prominent political leaders of both parties. President George W. Bush offered his version of the paradigm at the beginning of his campaign for the White House: "The case for trade is not just monetary, but moral," Bush declared in one of his earliest foreign-policy speeches in November 1999. "Economic freedom creates habits of liberty. And habits of liberty create expectations of democracy....Trade freely with China, and time is on our side."
中国在政治上必然会改变的论述模式，共和丶民主两党的政治领袖一再沿用。布希总统竞选总统初期，一开始就提出他在这方面的版本：「与中国的贸易，不单只是着眼於金钱，也同时是关乎道德。」
这是1999年11月有关外交政策最早的一次演说里宣布的。「经济自由创造自由的习惯，而自由的习惯创造对民主的期待…与中国自由贸易，时间站在我们这边。」
In saying this, Bush was merely echoing the words of Bill Clinton. The Democratic president had told Chinese President Jiang Zemin at a 1997 press conference that "you're on the wrong side of history," thus suggesting that "history" would open up China's political system. Earlier that year, Clinton had declared that the economic changes in China would help to "increase the spirit of liberty over time...I just think it's inevitable, just as inevitably the Berlin Wall fell."
布希此一讲法充其量是在附和柯林顿的话。柯林顿在1997年的一项记者会上曾向江泽民说「你站在历史错误的一边，」这意味「历史」会打开中国的政治体制。
该年稍早，柯林顿宣称中国经济的改变，将有助於「自由精神的推进…我认为这是必然的，就如柏林围墙必然倒下。」
I should emphasize here that when I am talking about political change in China, I am speaking about the fundamental realities of the current system, in which there is no organized political opposition, in which the press remains under censorship, and in which there are no elections beyond the limited and problematic elections at the township level. There are those who argue China's political system is already changing, but when they say that they are focusing on far lesser changes, ones that do not affect the one-party state and its monopoly on political power. The argument that the Chinese system is changing seeks to divert attention to smaller realities and away from the large ones.
在此，我要特别强调的是，当我论及中国的政治改变，我指的是现今体制的根本事实，那就是政治上缺乏有组织的反对势力丶新闻仍遭审查丶没有普选，除了影响有限丶颇有问题的村里长选举。
有人辩称中国政治体制已经在改变，但这些改变实在微不足道，并不足以影响党国一体与共产党对政治权力的独揽。中国政治体制已在改变的说法，用意是在将注意力转移到较小的事实，避开大的事实。
This paradigm of a China that is destined for political change has deep roots in American policy over the past 35 years. It took hold because it has served certain specific interests in Washington and within American society. At first, in the late 1970s and 1980s, this idea benefited America's national-security establishment. At the time, the United States was seeking close cooperation with China against the Soviet Union, so that the Soviet Union would have to worry about both America and China at once; the Pentagon was eager to ensure that the Soviet Union was required to deploy large numbers of troops along the Sino-Soviet border that might otherwise have been deployed in Europe. Amid the ideological struggles of the Cold War, cooperation with China's Communist regime was politically touchy in Washington. And so the notion that the Chinese leadership - in this case, the China of Deng Xiaoping -- was in the process of changing the country's political system helped smooth the way with Congress and the American public.
此一中国在政治上必然会改变的论述模式，根植於过去35年来的美国政策。它之能根深蒂固，是因为它符合华府以及美国社会某些的特殊利益。
首先，在1970年代末期与1980年代，此一论述模式有益美国国家安全体制。当时，美国寻求与中国的紧密合作以对抗苏联，如此一来，苏联必然在中苏边界部署重兵，若非如此，这些重兵将部署在欧洲。
冷战时期意识型态的对抗中，与中共政权合作，对华府而言是政治上敏感的问题。因此，当时中国的领导邓小平，即着手进行政治体制改变的说法，有助於减少来自国会与美国大众的阻碍。
In the 1990s, following the Soviet collapse, the paradigm of a China headed for political change attracted a new and different constituency: the business community. As trade and investment in China became ever more important, American companies (and their counterparts in Europe and Japan) found themselves repeatedly beset with questions about why they were doing business with a repressive regime, one which had so recently ordered its troops to fire at unarmed citizens. The paradigm of inevitable change offered multinational corporations the answer they needed. Not only was China destined to open up its political system, but trade would be the key that would unlock the door. Trade would lead to political liberalization and to democracy. The trouble is that the entire theory may be dead wrong.
1990年代，随着苏联的瓦解，此一中国迈向政治改变的论述模式，吸引了新的丶与过去不同的认同者：商业圈。当在中国的贸易投资益形重要时，美国公司（与欧洲和日本的公司）不断遭遇到跟专制政权做生意的质疑，这个政权不久前才下令军队向没有武装的人民开火。
而此一必然改变的论述模式，提供了跨国公司需要的答案。不仅中国注定会开放其政治体制，贸易更将是打开那道门的钥匙。贸易将会导致政治自由丶走向民主。问题是整个立论可能是全盘错误。
The notion that China's political system will inevitably move towards liberalization and democracy is what I call the Soothing Scenario for China's future. It is the one that dominates our official discourse. But it is really only one of three possibilities for where China is headed. Let me sketch out the others.
中国的政治体制必然会走向自由民主的说法，我称之为中国未来「安慰人心的局面」。此一说法主宰我们政府官员的谈话。不过，这只是中国未来三种可能走向其中一项。我下面勾漏的是另外两种可能。
The second possibility for China's future is what can be called the Upheaval Scenario. The Upheaval Scenario predicts that China is headed for some sort of major disaster, such as an economic collapse or political disintegration, because it won't be able to maintain political stability while continuing on its current course. On behalf of the Upheaval Scenario, one might point to the numerous reports of political unrest in China these days - the proliferation of labor strikes, farmers' protests, riots over environmental degradation and ethnic strife. There are also broader developments, such as the ever-growing disparity between rich and poor or the continuing prevalence of corruption in China, and the fragility of China's banking system.
中国未来的第二种可能，即所谓的「动乱局面」。
此一立论预言中国会走向某种重大灾难，比方经济崩溃或政治解体，因为中国若持续目前的走向，将无法维持政治稳定。站在这一派的说法，可能会指出中国近来政治动乱的无数报导──工人罢工有增无减丶农民抗议丶环境恶化引起的暴动丶种族对立；另外更广泛的发展，像是贫富差距越来越大丶中国遍在持续恶化的贪腐丶中国银行虚弱的体系等等。
The Upheaval Scenario for China gets a reasonable amount of attention in the United States. Lots of people spend quite a bit of time trying to figure out how much instability there is in China and what its impact will be, and there are lots of interesting arguments on all sides. My own belief is that the Chinese regime is ultimately strong enough to withstand these internal pressures - that there will be no "coming collapse of China," to quote the title of one book on the subject. China is a huge country, and it is particularly hard to draw conclusions about the overall political situation from what is happening in any one place or region. Labor strikes may spread through all of Northeast China; or political demonstrations may sweep through many of its leading cities; still, in the end such events don't determine the future direction of China.
「动乱局面」在美国获得相当程度的注意。不少人尝试了解中国会有多不稳定，将带来什麽冲击，而各方也提出有意思的辩论。不过，我自己则相信中国政权非常稳固，足以抵挡这些内部压力，套一句讨论这方面的一本书的书名，我们不会看到「中国即将崩溃」。
中国是一个庞大的国家，特别是关於其整个政治状况，我们很难从任何单一地区所发生的事件下结论。工人罢工可能会扩及中国整个东北，或政治示威可能会在几个重要的大城市扩散，不过，这些事件终究无法决定中国未来的走向。
The possibilities for China's future are not confined to these two scenarios, the Soothing Scenario or Upheaval. There is still another possibility: a Third Scenario. It is one that few people talk about or think about these days, at least not in the United States. It is this: What if China manages to continue on its current economic path and yet its political system does not change in any fundamental way? What if, twenty-five or thirty years from now, a wealthier, more powerful China continues to be run by a one-party regime that continues to repress organized political dissent much as it does today; and yet at the same time China is also open to the outside world and, indeed, is deeply intertwined with the rest of the world through trade, investment and other economic ties? Everyone assumes that the Chinese political system is going to open up - but what if it doesn't?
中国未来可能的发展并不限於这两套演论，即「安慰人心的局面」与「动乱局面」。还有另一种可能，即第三种演论。
这在目前仍然很少人讨论，至少在美国还没有人触及。即是说，万一中国尽其所能继续其目前所走的经济路线，但丝毫不做任何政治体制的根本改变？万一25或 30年後，一个更富裕丶更强盛的中国仍如今日一般，继续其一党专政丶镇压政治异议团体，同时对世界各国开放，在贸易丶投资与其他经济连结上，和世界有着盘根交错的关系；大家都假设中国的政治体制会开放，不过，要是没有呢？
In one way or another, the essentials of the current political system would remain intact: there would be no significant political opposition. There would be an active security apparatus to forestall organized political dissent. In other words, China, while growing stronger and richer, wouldn't change its political system in any fundamental way. It would continue along the same political course it is on today. Why do we Americans believe that, with advancing prosperity, China will automatically come to have a political system like ours? Is it simply because the Chinese now eat at McDonald's and wear blue jeans? To make this assumption about China is to repeat the mistakes others have made in the past - that is, to think wrongly that the Chinese are inevitably becoming like us. "With God's help, we will lift Shanghai up and up until it is just like Kansas City," Senator Kenneth Wherry of Nebraska declared during the era of Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist China. Those dreams ended in disappointment.So, too,in the early 1950s, Soviet leaders thought they were recreating a communist China that would be similar to the Soviet Union. They also were wrong.
不管是哪种方式，目前政治体制的实质仍然不会受到丝毫影响：我们不会看到有份量的政治反对势力，可以看见的是执行力很强的安全机制对政治反动组织采取先发制人。换言之，一个更强盛丶更富裕的中国，不会在政治体制上做任何根本的改变。其政治路线将与现今所走的没有差异。
何以我们美国人要相信中国在步向富裕後，自然而然就会有一个跟我们相似的政治体制？就因为中国人现在也吃麦当劳丶穿牛仔裤？做这样的臆想，即是重蹈过去别人所犯的错误，也就是说，错误地认为中国人必然会像我们一样。
在蒋介石国民党时代的中国，当时内布拉斯加的参议员坎尼斯·惠瑞宣称：「有上帝襄助，我们可以把上海拉拔起来，直到像我们的堪萨斯城。」那些梦想最後以失望收场。同样的情况也发生在1950年代初期，当时苏联的领导认为，他们扶植的中国共产党将会是苏联的再制。他们同样错了。
Let me address one of the main arguments advanced by those who put forward the Soothing Scenario. Proponents often point to the recent history of other countries in East Asia. In particularly, they regularly cite the examples of Taiwan and South Korea. From the 1950s through the 1970s, both had authoritarian systems in which police and security officials regularly locked up political opponents of the regimes. Then during the 1980s, as rapid economic development brought increasing prosperity to Taiwan and South Korea, both countries opened up to democracy. And so, the logic goes, China will eventually follow along the political path of Taiwan and South Korea.
现在我将针对「安慰人心的局面」的主要论点进行剖析。
此说的支持者经常指出东亚其他国家近来的演变，特别是台湾与南韩最常被当作例子。从1950年代到1970年代，这两个国家都施行威权体制，警察与国安人员关押反对独裁政权的人士时有所闻。之後在1980年代，经济的突飞猛进带来台湾与南韩的繁荣，两国并迈向民主。因此，同理，中国也将跟随台湾与南韩的政治路径。
There are two problems with this logic. First, China is a much bigger country than either Taiwan or South Korea. It includes vast, impoverished inland areas as well as coastal cities of the east. If China were confined exclusively to these coastal areas, such as Guangdong, the province abutting Hong Kong, one could easily imagine it following the path of Taiwan and South Korea. Certainly Shanghai, with its educated, sophisticated citizenry and intense interest in politics, is as ready for democracy as any city has ever been.
此一逻辑有两个漏洞。
首先，中国比台湾或南韩大很多，领土涵盖广大贫瘠的内地与东部沿海城市。若中国就只是这些沿海地区，像邻近香港的广东，那我们就很容易想像它会跟随台湾与南韩的路径。而上海拥有受教育丶世故丶对政治有强烈兴趣的市民，要准备迎接民主，不会输给其他任何城市。
But large expanses of China are isolated - geographically, politically and intellectually - from cities such as Shanghai. Outsiders who declare that China will follow the political evolution of Taiwan and South Korea, based on their visits to eastern Chinese cities like Beijing and Shanghai, are roughly akin to foreigners who travel only to New York City and Boston and then come to the conclusion that the United States will behave like Western Europe.
不过，中国大部分地区，在地理上丶政治上丶智识上，仍是与像上海这些城市隔绝。局外人根据他们到访像北京与上海这些中国东岸城市，进而宣称中国将步向台湾与南韩的政治演进，这就像外国人仅参访过纽约市与波士顿，就骤下结论说，美国的作为将会和西欧一样。
There is also a second, more important way in which China is different from Taiwan and South Korea. When those two East Asian governments democratized in the 1980s, both of them were dependent on the United States for their military security. Indeed, direct American pressure played a crucial role in supporting the movement towards political liberalization in both countries. In the case of South Korea, at a key moment in June 1987 when the country was engulfed by riots, the Reagan administration bluntly told President Chun Doo Hwan he should give way and hold elections. In the case of Taiwan, leading Democratic members of the U.S. Congress took the lead, making plain to President Chiang Ching-kuo during the 1980s that his Kuomintang government was rapidly losing American support, and that the only way to regain it was through democratic reforms.
中国与台湾丶南韩之间，还有第二点更重要的差异。
当这两个东亚国家在1980年代实施民主化时，他们仰赖美国保护他们的军事安全。事实上，在这两个国家，美国的直接压力，为政治自由化运动扮演了主要的推手。
以南韩为例，1987年6月是个关键时刻，当时这个国家因为暴动而陷入重重危机，雷根政府不客气地告诉全斗换总统，应该放弃独裁，举行选举。至於台湾，民主党重量级的国会议员首先开炮，明白地告诉1980年代担任总统的蒋经国，他的国民党政府正急速失去美国的支持，要重新获得支持，只有藉民主改革。
But China of course will never be as dependent on the United States for military protection as were South Korea and Taiwan, It is vastly less subject to American pressure, goading or influence. As a result, there is no reason to believe it will automatically follow their political evolution.
不过，中国将不会像南韩与台湾那样仰赖美国的军事保护。它远远不受美国的压力丶驱使或影响。值此之故，实在没有理由相信中国必然会步向台湾与南韩的政治演进。
In conformity with America's continuing adherence to the Soothing Scenario for China (that is, the belief in China's inevitable political evolution), we have developed a series of rationalizations and euphemisms that help to maintain our beliefs. To take one example: "Two Steps Forward, One Step Back." When news breaks that China has rounded up someone or some group opposing the regime, proponents of the Soothing Scenario warn that one must not draw broader conclusions about China and the nature of its political system from this one particular untoward event. This latest arrest, it is said, was just one minor setback. Over the past two decades, the same cliche has been used, over and over again, to explain away repression or the absence of political change in China. Sometimes, when China carries out a broad crackdown, it looks as if the more accurate description would be "one step forward, five steps back." But the "two steps forward, one step back" cliche does not countenance such retrogression. Thus, even unpleasant news about Chinese repression tends to be safely embedded in an assumption of progress, a soft, warm gauzy wrapping of hopefulness.
为了不背离美国坚持中国的「安慰人心的局面」（亦即，相信中国的政治体制必然会演进），我们发展了一系列合理化说辞与委婉说法，以便有足够的燃料持续我们的信仰。比方「进两步，退一步」就是其中一个例子。
当新闻报导中国逮捕反对其政权的个人或团体时，支持「安慰人心的局面」的人就会警告说，不可因为单一特殊的事件，就骤然对中国及其政治体制的本质做扩大的结论。最近的逮捕只不过是一个小小的退步。过去20年来这类老掉牙的说辞被一用再用，藉以淡化镇压或中国在政治改变上的不做为。
有时候，当中国采取大规模镇压时，看起来比较正确的描述应是：「进一步，退五步。」不过，「进两步，退一步」的老调是不会容许这样的退步。也因此，有关中国镇压的不愉快消息似乎都能够安全地埋在一个进步的推论，一个以柔和丶温暖丶朦胧所包装的希望里。
Finally, it is worth considering the possibility that the paradigm of inevitable political change that our leaders use in talking in public about China does not represent what they privately believe.
最後，我们执政当局在公开讲话时，宣称中国政治体制未来必然改变，但他们私底下有可能不相信此一论述模式，这种可能性值得我们思考。
It is possible to imagine a set of beliefs about China as follows: "We understand that China's political system is not destined for political liberalization. The Chinese system is going to remain relatively unchanged for a very long time, and the regime is going to continue to repress any sign of organized political opposition. Still, we want to and have to do business with China, both economically and diplomatically."
对中国的信仰，我们可以想像如下的说法：
「我们了解到中国的政治体制并不必然会走向政治自由，中国的体制在很长的一段时间仍将维持较为不变的局面，该政权将持续镇压任何政治反对势力的蛛丝马迹。不过，在经济上与外交上，我们还是希望而且必须跟中国做生意。」
This would be a point of view that is certainly clear and coherent, and I suspect that among America's political and financial leaders, there are many who privately hold this view. It is worth asking why this point of view is so little discussed in public. The answer, I believe, is that American policy towards China requires public support -- and the way to maintain public support for American policy, particularly its current relationship with China is to claim that this will serve the purpose of changing China's political system. Since 1989, virtually every change in U.S. policy towards China has been justified to the American public on the basis that it would help to open up China's political system. Whenever a president, either Republican or Democratic, spoke of his policy of "engagement" with China, it was said to be a way of changing China. When the George H.W. Bush and Clinton administrations extended most-favored-nation trade benefits to China, they asserted that the trade would help to open up China. When the U.S. Congress voted to support China's entry into the World Trade Organization, once again, congressional leaders justified their votes as a way of helping to bring political liberalization to China.
这将会是一个清楚一致的观点，我想美国政界与商界的领袖有不少人私底下是采取这样的看法。
我们要问的是何以这样的观点甚少公开讨论？我相信答案是美国对中国的政策需要大众的支持，而让大众支持美国政策的方式，就是宣称我们的目的是在改变中国政治体制，特别是目前与中国的关系。
自1989年以来几乎每一次美国对中国政策的改变，诉诸美国大众合理化的说辞，都是基於帮助打开中国的政治体制，不管是共和党或民主党的说法，一提到其与中国的「交往」政策，都说是改变中国的一种方式。
当布希与柯林顿政府延长中国最惠国待遇时，他们都宣称贸易有助於中国的开放。当美国国会投票支持中国加入世界贸易组织时，国会领袖们对他们投下赞成票的合理化说辞是，这有助於中国的政治自由化。
Our economic policies in dealing with China have caused considerable hardship to significant numbers of Americans. Across the United States, factories have closed and millions of Americans have been put out of work. There have been some benefits to those policies as well, especially to companies investing or manufacturing in China; yet if these policies had been judged exclusively in economic terms, they might not have won the public support and congressional approval that was necessary. As a result, the American people have been told repeatedly that the reasons for our policy were not merely economic but political. Unrestricted free trade with China was going to lead to political liberalization. It was going to open the way for China to become a pluralistic country. These political arguments were the ones that made the difference. Without the claim that trade would open up the Chinese political system, trade legislation probably would not have been enacted. It is difficult if not impossible to find an American president or congressional leader who said, "China has a repressive political system and it's not going to change, but let's pass this legislation anyway."
我们处理中国的经济政策已导致为数不少的美国人民陷於困境。美国境内许多工厂关闭，上百万的美国人因此失业。
有些人的确因为这些政策获得利益，特别是在中国投资或生产的公司；不过，这些政策若仅就经济而言，可能不会赢得大众的支持或国会通过。结果就是，美国人民一再被告知，我们的政策不单只是经济，还关乎政治的考量。与中国毫无限制的自由贸易，会把中国导向政治自由化，将使中国成为一个多元的国家。
就是这些政治论调使得事情变得不一样。若非宣称贸易可以打开中国政治体制，贸易立法很有可能不会制定。我们很难想像一个美国总统或国会议长会说，「中国有个压制的政治体制，而且短期内不会有所改变，不过无论如何，还是让我们通过立法。」
In sum, I think the paradigm of inevitable change impairs America's thinking and its public discussion of China today. The paradigm prevents us from coming up with policies towards a China whose political may not change, in any fundamental way, for a long time. But I think the paradigm of inevitable change will endure -- that whenever American leaders talk in public about China, we will continue to hear some version or another of the Soothing Scenario.
总而言之，我以为必然会改变的论述模式损害了美国对中国的思维和公众讨论。中国在很长的一段时间内，政治上可能不会有任何根本的改变，而这个论述模式阻碍了我们针对此一状况拟定政策。
不过，我个人认为必然会改变的论述模式仍将持续，每当美国领导人公开谈话论及中国时，我们仍将继续听到「安慰人心的局面」或其某种版本出现。
2007.02.09
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